The text explores the functionality of the notion of a wild card event as a means to articulate uncertainty and incorporate it in the performance of various realms of human activity. It starts by examining some common narrative modalities through which uncertainty is being approached. The second section illustrates how the notion of a wild card event fits those modalities and how scanning for wild cards serves as an anticipatory strategy to compensate for certain lack of experience, ignorance and insufficient knowledge and as a very specific technique for temporal adjustment. The third section demonstrates its applicability, influential presence and productivity (including profitability) in three realms -futures studies, the market and politics.
Introduction
There is a great deal of uneasiness bound with the human condition and its relation to time. Humans, as temporally conscious beings, are somehow trapped between two extremes -the anxiety of absolute uncertainty and the fear of full predictability. Rhe former denotes ' state of random existence with no discernible regularities and continuities, i.e. ' situation in which the mere notion of any future would become problematic. On the other hand, the prospect of full predictability is no less frightening since it evokes associations with unbearable mechanization of life by foreseeable and controlled regularities, i.e. a condition which makes the concepts of novelty, surprise and free will to lose their significance.
Nevertheless, uncertainty is a common feature of everyday life and a reason for individuals to employ different strategies to mitigate its consequences. One such strategy is using the notion of a wild card event in order to imagine and thus discursively tame what might be an abrupt surprising event with low probability and high impact. The following text will explore the functionality of that figure as a means to articulate uncertainty and incorporate it in the performance of different realms of human activity. It starts by examining some common narrative modalities by which uncertainty is being approached. The second section illustrates how the notion of a wild card event fits those modalities and how scanning for wild cards serves as an anticipatory strategy to compensate for certain lack of experience, ignorance and insufficient knowledge and as a very specific technique for temporal adjustment. The third section demonstrates its applicability, influential presence and productivity (including profitability) in three different realms -futures studies, the market and politics. Finally, the text presents some concluding remarks on the matter and a table summarizing the findings of the paper.
How is uncertainty being narrated?
Beyond the philosophical elaborations on uncertainty and indeterminacy lays the fact that individuals and entities are in constant struggle to secure more 'visibility' of the future by projecting current regularities while anticipating imponderables. It seems that the problem of foreseeing the forthcoming is mostly about ignorance with regard to the present (in interpreting existing trends and identifying possible sources of surprise), which is at the heart of the common unpreparedness in face of the unexpected. But how can we draw the line of the possible fore-seeing, of our ability to capture the continuity or the rift between past, present and future events? Where is the spinning wheel of the 'thread of history' or 'the invisible hand of Providence' which occupied the minds of 18th and 19th century thinkers? Where are the zones of uncertainty, outlining the verge of possible forecasting and planning, which Niccolo Machiavelli in the 16th century thought to belong only to the realm of Fortuna? Today, what we cannot see, understand or expect plays a huge role in the lives and activities of individuals, families, corporations, states and international organizations. With the ever evolving complexity of the global system one of the main challenges is to grasp uncertainty without turning a blind eye on regularities, because the accumulative effect of existing regularities might happen to be the source of destabilizing events.
Before indulging in details on how wild cards serve as a discursive means to grasp and mentally tame the unexpected, an important distinction must be made. One needs to acknowledge the difference between genuine uncertainty and the notion of uncertainty. The first one refers to situations when something previously unknown and unimaginable enters reality. The image of it has been impossible up until the moment it happens. What we call here genuine uncertainty is very much what Alasdair MacIntyre (2007), leaning on the works of Carl Popper, calls 'radical conceptual innovation ' (pp.94-95) . Once being invented, uttered, described or conceptualized, it ceases to be radical conceptual innovation, since it has already entered reality and is being thought upon and articulated. Genuine uncertainty is different from the notion of uncertainty, i.e. the variety of ways human beings imagine the unpredictability of the future and the causes which produce that same unpredictability. It is either being conceptualized as ontologically inherent or as stemming from the epistemic deficits of human cognition. In the first case uncertainty is understood as indeterminacy, that is, a condition in which events cannot be explained with law-like regularities or some visible causal relation, but seem to emerge out of pure randomness. This is very close to what some philosophical and religious narratives would denote as 'miracle' -when nothing in the observable world and our knowledge about it could have possibly led to the anticipation and prediction of such an event (this does not mean that it cannot be imagined). Within this logic, uncertain events appear as independent and not complying with current regularities. Being indeterminate, they seem to be the only plausible manifestation of freedom in a philosophical sense (Arendt, 1961) . The second account on uncertainty focuses on epistemological deficits -the boundaries of what we know, the conceptual and logical distortions in our interpretations, the poverty of the methodological approaches in the pursuit of knowledge about the future. Within this understanding 'chance' is not a driving force in the unfolding of events but a word to denote our impaired visibility on actual cause-and-effect interactions. Their complexity remains hidden or inscrutable for the observer's eye. Therefore, surprises and imponderables are not ontologically uncertain phenomena but an inevitable result of the fact that humans (even with the assistance of advanced science and technology) are far from being perfect cognitive agents.
In the face of the unknown, human beings tend to linguistically tame uncertainty by giving familiar names, just like sailors and conquistadors named places in the New World and turned language into a means of invasion (Todorov, 1999: 27-28) . By the same token, contemporary anxieties on future uncertainties lead to employing a similar discursive strategy to handle unpredictability and providing images of low-probable unexpected events. In our everyday language we have a myriad of words at disposal to articulate them: wild cards, black swans (Taleb, 2007) , strategic shocks, catastrophic risks, game changers, tsunamis of change (Dator, 1994) , etc. They are all incorporated in several discursive modalities of approaching uncertainty.
The first one is the notion of an unprecedented event. It entails no historical analogy, repeatability and relevance to familiar experience. When describing an event as unprecedented we assume that familiar research tools and prognostication techniques are not much of use. They cannot grasp the rift in the time flow, due to the absence of visible cause-and-effect structures which usually reveal the temporal interdependence between given events. Another discursive modality, in expressing the idea of aberration or disruption in recognizable regularities, is the notion of surprise. Surprise does not imply that an event is unprecedented or unimaginable, rather than one that is unexpected. Depending on its magnitude, it could be experienced either as disturbance or as a shock. In the realm of contemporary futures studies we witness a lot of attempts to identify possible sources of surprise. These include human negligence or human scientific advancement (collapse of social systems, new sources of energy, cure for aging, global communications breakdown, etc.), and forces out of mankind's control (large-scale geological or meteorological events, deadly pandemics, evidence of alien life in outer space, etc.). In its most extreme and pessimistic forms, surprise is underlying various apocalyptic narratives on the future. Although it denotes events with low or negligent probability of occurrence, it proves to be helpful in contemplating the allegedly significant impact on structures, contexts and agents with regard to their stability. Which leads us to the next discursive modality in thinking uncertainty, and that is the notion of instability. Usually the stability of a research object is grounds for developing a forecast because it points to (although not necessarily guarantees) some regularity in its dynamics and consequently, a greater degree of predictability. But when we encounter instability, for instance inwrought in the plasticity and impaired visibility of power agents, we face a 'loss of orientation' and as a result we produce hardly reliable and poor forecasts on the future. Instability of social structures lays the limits of recognizable regularities. But what happens when instability itself starts to be perceived as the only steady regularity? This causes certain worries which find their way in public discourse (in politics, economics, science, culture) through the media on the issue of security, especially in the decade following the 11 September terrorist attacks. Within various realms of human life security have generally been perceived as the capability to withstand the consequences of surprise introduced by adverse agents or natural disasters. The notion of security is a relative concept as it reflects subjective perceptions of current stability (certain predictability of the future). Focusing on the failure to achieve security (in defence, health, business, schools, domestic affairs, food, etc.) has turned into a means for conceptualizing uncertainty in all aspects of our lives.
To resume, the unprecedented, surprise, instability and insecurity are all discursive modes to articulate uncertainty, understood either as epistemological deficit or as ontologically given. Of course, they are not strictly delineated discursive modalities and very often overlap in defining each other's essence. Nevertheless, they outline some of the features of the intellectual climate in which uncertainty appears as a grand concern. All of the above notions reveal that uncertainty is in a sense asymmetry -it illustrates the increasing non-proportionality of causes and effects (e.g. insignificant events might disturb the functionality of whole systems). Asymmetry reflects distorted causality and a breach of norms as institutionalized expectations on the future and represents a tremendous challenge for all those seriously concerned with the future.
Wild cards as a discursive and epistemic means to tame uncertainty
There are various discursive means to articulate what seems to be uncertain with regard to the future. One such figure, to introduce the image of low probable or unexpected event with high impact, is 'wild card'. The notion of a wild card, employed in the realm of futures studies or in everyday talk, conveys meanings implied in the abovementioned discursive modes in articulating uncertainty. First, it could sometimes be used to imagine an unprecedented event, with which humans have no experience, e.g. contact with alien civilization, global nuclear war, AIDS becoming air-transmitted, etc. Second, wild card as a figure of speech is evoked when contemplating on surprise, that is, on unexpected events, which cause perplexity, dismay and even shock and for which people are not prepared properly (terrorist attacks, natural disasters, financial meltdowns, nuclear plant incidents, pandemics, etc.). Third, wild card is a discursive means to denote an event which causes instability as long as it disturbs the functionality of whole systems. For instance, if an asteroid hits the Earth the consequences would be disastrous for various realms of human activity -survival, health, food, environment, trade, infrastructure, etc. All these bring us to the fourth dimension of uncertainty -the implications for the state of security. Wild card events, whatever they might be -nature-related or human-induced, could weaken the state of security of a system or an entity. For example, cyber security programs are developed to anticipate or deal with cyber attacks which may ruin the stability of whole systems (military defense, banking, power plants, water supply, provision of public services, etc.). Finally, the wild card trope implies the notion of asymmetry as long as those sudden and abrupt events are ones of disproportionality between cause and effect -they are assumed to have low probability and high impact.
Scanning for wild cards is a strategy which satisfies a profound psychological and practical need to map uncertainty. It provides a discursive means to imagine and contemplate on the sources of unpredictability, which intrude into the lives of individuals, institutions and organizations. Envisioning what might catch us unprepared and vulnerable performs several functions.
To begin with, searching for wild cards is an anticipatory strategy which compensates for the lack of experience with certain events or situations. Imagining what has never happened is a good preparatory tool for surprises, at least as a mental experiment. It cannot guarantee effective reaction in the moment wild card events actually happen. Nevertheless, it could promote flexibility in thinking about the future by contemplating on the possibility that everyday assumptions about tomorrow could be shattered by an abrupt unexpected event. This is what stands behind Herman Kahn's strategic thinking and contemplating the 'unthinkable'. In the early 1970s he seriously considered the plausibility of a nuclear war between the two superpowers of that time -the USA and the USSR, and the whole array of horrendous consequences that would have followed in case of its occurrence. The logic underlying his scenario-building approach was to open some room to think about an unprecedented event, one which we do not have experience with. The fact that a thermonuclear war was conveniently perceived as highly unlikely, undesirable and as the end of humanity does not mean that it was impossible, unwinnable or one that will actually doom mankind to extinction (Kahn, 2007) . Sometimes the lack of experience with particular event or situation makes it seem highly improbable due to our inert thinking and conventional assumptions. Integrating the images of such wild card events in futures thinking practice is a step forward overcoming an eventual paralysis and shock in case they enter reality. Clearly, the psychological effect of such an approach is debatable, especially with regard to human-induced cataclysms. On the one hand, imagining the catastrophe and its consequences could be defended as a helpful tool for psychological preparation in case it happens. However, being aware of the mechanisms of self-fulfilling prophesies, imagining something as a feasible possibility might actually trigger actions which could lead to its occurrence. There is also a third possibility -the insistent reminding of the detrimental effects of such an event might lead to self-destroying prophesy and strategies of redirecting the course of the events.
Scanning for wild cards has another very important function -to fill in the black spots produced by ignorance with regard to the future. Ignorance is associated with the epistemic deficits human beings present as imperfect cognitive beings. Ignorance is not necessarily a pejorative term. It denotes certain lack or insufficiencies in knowledge with regard to a particular issue. As to futures research, ignorance is usually about the sources of uncertainty -those factors, driving forces or events which increase unpredictability. More knowledge on a problem actually means greater predictability of its future. Even if it experiences non-linear development, the mere knowledge of that makes our assumptions about its future clearer although not necessarily accurate. In other words, knowledge about the limitations of knowledge, or being aware of the essence of ignorance, has its merits.
One aspect of ignorance is the pure unawareness of the existence of a particular problem, which may enter reality as a wild card-type eventsuddenly and with huge impact on the functionality of whole systems. This is especially relevant to unintentional human-induced disasters. For instance, geo-engineering programs and weather modification may cause unintended and unforeseen consequences (since the climate of the planet is dynamic and extremely complex system), which enter the lives of peoples and places as wild cards (Marshallsay, 2012) . But it is also relevant for unpredictable nature-related events such as volcano eruptions, meteorite impact, major earthquakes, riverbed overflows and floods due to unforeseen heavy rain, etc. The unawareness in question might be due to lack of knowledge or sophisticated technology for anticipating an event or due to research and knowledge creation priorities which do not comply with the problematic in question. For example, financing mechanisms for the production of knowledge within the European Union area was supportive of the aim of creating an innovation union (European Commission, 2014). As a result, social sciences were and are still underfinanced unless they prioritized research projects on cultural heritage. This left the examination of pressing social problems unattended -social inequalities and poverty, social unrest, the rise of far-right populist and xenophobic movements, the plight of migrant populations, grave health problems, the spread of mental illness, etc. As a result of this type of unawareness, the consequences of not approaching such issues properly might very likely manifest themselves as wild cards (riots, political assassinations, domestic terrorism, fascists winning elections, etc.).
Ignorance might also be an effect of pronounced neglect. This refers to situations when warning data, information and analyses are available but not paid due attention because of ideological biases of scientists and policymakers or because of the inherent disciplinary limitations of given research realm. As a result of unwise neglect of relevant knowledge on particular matter, which otherwise should have been incorporated in shaping the future of that matter, the consequences might be disastrous and experienced as wild card events. For instance, prior to the Crisis of 2008, there were people who had been warning about what might have come. Among these were Dean Baker, Med Jones, Nouriel Roubini, Peter Shiff (Wall Street Economists Institute, 2011), etc. Their analyses were neglected by conventional wisdom of mainstream economics, which was backed up by neoliberal political elites. There are numerous reasons why their forecasts have not been given serious consideration, one being that every historic period has its doomsday prophets, which are perceived renegades in some academic filed, and which are not necessarily accurate in their predictions. Still, in the case of the crash of 2008, there were also some within the economic mainstream (like Raguram Rajan, an IMF chief economist) who were not delivering outright forecasts but were warning about the increasing instability of the system with regard to the distribution of risk (Rajan, 2005) . This was practically an admission and a signal that the financial realm has been producing more and more uncertainties, which might appear on the surface as wild card events. In such cases the resilience of particular assumptions turns into a source of uncertainty and a generator for wild cards. It was evident in what Alan Greenspan said shortly after the meltdown about his conceptual framework (ideology) on markets and regulations: 'That's precisely the reason I was shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well ' (Public Broadcasting Services, 2008) .
Another aspect of ignorance is manifested as problematic temporal sensitivity. With the dominant presentism of our busy age, the past is experienced more and more as a patchwork of evanescent moments, which can hardly sustain an integrated picture of the present, not to mention intelligible images of the future. We seem to inhabit a fractured type of reality, a result of numerous trend-breaking disruptions, which set new outlooks, invent new languages and inspire new (and sometimes dubious) institutional responses with the aim of better navigating into the future -11 September, hurricane Katrina, terrorist attacks around the world, the tsunami in Asia, the financial and economic crisis of 2008, the Fukushima incident, the Arab spring, the Syrian conflict, the takeover of Crimea and the unrest in Ukraine to name a few. How could one elaborate a narrative, i.e. a stable, holistic and logical story, when the mediated information is fractured, speedy and in constant supply, like a bombardment of bits and pieces (Lash, 2002) ? In such atomistic and scrambled reality, every event emerges anew, deprived of history, and somehow even futureless because of the inevitably perishing media attention. When pondering on the Syria 'surprise' from 2011 on we usually forget that it is a part of a series of long-lasting problems in the region and in Syria itself. It did not happen out of the blue, although at the beginning it was presented as a surprising event in itself. When the world witnessed in dismay the easiness with which Russia gained control over Crimea, it was because current knowledge on the issue was not temporally sensitive. Otherwise, it could have assumed that such scenario was not only possible, but having in mind the history of the region and the current shift to a multipolar world order, it could have seemed even highly probable. Instead, it was perceived and experienced as a surprise and even shock due to the Russian ostentatious audacity. Interestingly enough, erased traces of history may turn out to be the sources of uncertainty. Then we experience an event as a wild card because we have been blind to the gradual change that had actually led to it (Hiltunen, 2006) .
To sum up, ignorance denotes our imperfection as cognitive agents. Because of it people often fail to address sources of uncertainty. This impaired visibility on the future might manifest itself as inexperience, unawareness, neglect or problematic temporal sensitivity. In any case the individual, the decision-maker or the futurist need to pay closer attention not only to what they had not previously considered but also to examine the unshakable assumptions upon which they reflect, anticipate and act daily. Such an understanding is at the heart of what James Dewar (2004) calls an assumption-based planning. Although his methodology is not designed to be universally applied and is proposed as a tool for improving an organization's ability to avoid surprises (but certainly not eliminating them all), it is a good reminder that wild cards sometimes stem from oversight of what we already know (overlooked and forgotten uncertainties, load-bearing and vulnerable assumptions).
The third function which scanning for wild cards performs is as an anticipatory strategy for temporal adjustment. Time is usually conceptualized as specific sense for change, which human beings construct, perceive and experience differently in various historical periods, cultural contexts and technological settings. In everyday language it is often articulated as some external environment which has its own pace that people need to synchronize with. This made possible the emergence of futuristic accounts such as that of Alvin Toffler (1970) , who introduced the term 'futureshock' to denote a critical condition in which people could hardly adapt to the speedy acceleration of time. This is the reason why he suggested that a habit of anticipating the future should be promoted and taught from an early age in order to cope with the vertigo caused by galloping time. Within such efforts searching for wild cards and weak signals seems appropriate strategy for temporal adjustment.
It is widely recognized now that one of the tremendous difficulties before governments is to react to emerging problems in a timely manner. Furthermore, it is even harder to identify those problems on time. Additional difficulty stems from the fact that expert knowledge is neither clear enough nor always right about the possible consequences of certain problems, or about the expected results of proposed policy measures. In a way, politics is time management of problem identification, reaction and effect, which are usually 'out of sync'. Therefore, scanning for wild cards might be helpful in avoiding what Susan Strange (1997) called 'non-decisions' -missed opportunities to react adequately to current developments in order to influence the long-term future. It is very important to focus on weak signals (unclear observables warning us about the probability of future events) -latent hazards, emerging challenges and opportunities, posing threats, etc., to compensate for the impaired visibility on the future. Relying on political instincts and foresight is becoming more and more important due to the inability of rigorous scientific research to produce timely results. Contemporary politics faces a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, it strives for evidence-based policies, i.e. to substantiate policy measures with hard science results. On the other hand, in highly dynamic globalized systems, hard science results are neither easy to achieve, nor deprived of methodological weaknesses, provisionality and sometimes contradicting sets of data. This might very well impair the intended reactivity of institutions with regard to future uncertainties. Scanning for wild cards seems quite arbitrary, but mapping underlying developments leaning on the analytical skills of the observer might be an adequate means for overcoming the temporal void.
Wild cards applications The Futures Studies realm and wild cards
The greatest challenge before the field of Futures Studies has always been to secure an adequate framework for producing reliable knowledge about the future. In a highly dynamic and volatile global context it is not an easy task. We inhabit a world in which trend extrapolations have less and less predictive power and in which discontinuities seem to have become 'the new normal'. Recent developments in the Futures Studies field reflect those changes. It has made a transition from scientific forecasting to social construction (Slaughter, 2002) ; its conceptual emphasis has shifted from predicting a unidirectional future to creating multiple images of the possible, probable and preferable futures (Bell, 2002) ; it denounced the mere possibility of scientific prognoses to embrace envisioning and building positive images of the future (Masini, 2006; Van der Helm, 2009 ). Mapping uncertainty, by looking for both amiable and disastrous events, which may redirect current developments, has become a major concern. It has been paid more and more attention due to emerging problems with regard to accuracy in projecting recognized regularities. Thus, even within the public discourse, in an attempt to communicate some meaning and give imagery of uncertainty, people often employ phrases such as wild cards, black swans, tectonic shifts, etc. Meanwhile, in the futures realm more qualitative and semi-qualitative methods have been used along with quantitative (Popper, 2008) . It has been acknowledged that in an unstable environment of multidirectional non-linear causality, in which the Enlightenment prognostic paradigm does not work, the best course of action shall not be to lean on traditional frequency statistics. Rather, searching and scanning for signposts, weak signals, undercurrents and seeds of change would show possible point of intervention for pursuing alternative futures while escaping some inevitable tomorrow. Scenarios, causal layered analysis (Inayatullah, 2002) , backcasting, visioning, essays -they all assume the plasticity of the future, i.e. the possibility to shape it by identifying key temporal intersections for interference. This means that the Futures Studies field has not resorted to postmodern anti-utopist pessimism about the mere possibility to predict the future (and by doing so to deprive of merit and sense any attempt to think about the future). Instead, it has adopted a more creative approach -to use uncertainty as an instrument of change. For that end scanning for wild cards proves to be a very helpful approach. It has been applied in various foresight initiatives, especially in scenario building, where identifying possible sources of discontinuity is crucial. Imagining wild cards and their cross impact with current regularities produces multiple versions of the future to be considered. As any future research tool, scanning for wild cards contributes to extending our visibility on the future. This may not be in the form of accurate prognoses about the days of tomorrow but at least to promote our awareness about the vulnerability of current developments and to encourage all efforts for identifying some of the sources of that same vulnerability. Therefore, searching for wild cards could not predict surprises; nevertheless, it raises our awareness about the role of uncertainty in general, which in itself is quite helpful in strengthening our preparedness and resilience in face of the unexpected. Another merit of imagining wild cards is that it encourages futurists to examine those points and structures in a system which sustain its functionality, i.e. those weaknesses which once exposed to unanticipated circumstances, might lead to disastrous consequences.
For example, it is well known that coronal mass ejections (CMEs) of the sun could harm power grids here on Earth or collide with electronics aboard on satellites and disrupt their systems (Fox, 2013) . Thus, they might lead to problems with power supply and communication, which in its turn could lead to detrimental consequences for various realms of human activitytransport navigation, financial markets and even individual wellbeing. (How, for example, would one call for help if needs immediate medical attention or become a victim of a crime?) What is really worth considering when we approach an event as a wild card is what it reveals to be the weaknesses of our everyday lives. CMEs, for instance, illustrate to what extent human activities are dependent on electricity and satellite technology. That is why wild cards are a means to expand the peripheral vision to 'stretch', 'expand' and 'crack' the thinking paradigm (Barber, 2006) of futurists and make them sensitive about possible sources of discontinuity while promoting holistic research. This may not lead to prophetically accurate prognoses. However, it is very important for building capacities for reaction by identifying weaknesses threatening the overall resilience of a system.
Wild cards and the market
In the economic realm, the idea of a wild card event has turned out to be very productive. On the one hand, scanning for wild cards is an important element of the process of corporate strategic planning. Managing uncertainty is pointed out as crucial for surviving in a highly volatile, global and extremely competitive market environment. Thus, pondering on wild cards is helpful in building a capacity for reaction by training flexibility to changes and surprising events with economic consequences. In the field of business strategy this tradition has been launched with the work of Pierre Wack for the Royal Dutch/Shell. For scenario planning, anticipating major shifts in the business environment is crucial. ' The future is no longer stable; it has become a moving target. No single ''right'' projection should be deduced from past behavior. The better approach, I believe, is to accept uncertainty, try to understand it, make it part of our reasoning. Uncertainty today is not just an occasional, temporary deviation from a reasonable predictability; it is a basic structural feature of the business environment.' (Wack, 1985) Scanning for wild cards is not only a good learning tool for the management echelons to examine and question their assumptions about the future in order to enhance their reactivity in a turbulent market environment. It is a useful source of ideas on how to respond to and manage uncertainty. Peter Drucker suggested that the 'times of discontinuity' we inhabit require more organizational innovations, based on the crafty management of our ignorance (Drucker, 1993: 175) . Not adapting to change, but destabilization should be the new modus operandi of organizations (Drucker, 1993: 51) ; not to prepare for discontinuities but introducing discontinuities leads to competitive advantage and promises for success. Realizing new products, services or even social innovations is part of the competitive strategy of firms and corporations. Instead of adapting to the ever changing environment, they attempt at introducing the changes for the competition to adapt to.
Uncertainty and managing wild cards within the market might turn out to be very profitable. But also the mere image of a wild card event could be economically productive. On the one hand, it is undeniable element in the reproduction of the culture of fear, which expanded prominently in the decade after the 11 September bombings and was gradually institutionalized by a process of what some theorists refer to as securitization (e.g. Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995) . The mere image of a malevolent and violent intrusion (a wild card event) pervades the imagination of people in all realms of human activity. It nurtures the military industrial complex, the securitization of public institutions and private property (surveillance systems), the insurance sector (securitization of life, health and property), etc. Other business sectors make profit not by exploiting the need to counteract a wild card event but exactly the opposite -by selling the idea of a positive life-changing event. Gambling is a paradigmatic example with this respect.
With regard to the consumption of quasi-experiences of uncertainty, the wild card-conscious mind have always resorted in arts -fiction, textual or visual fantasies, unusual novel plots, paintings, movies, video-games, and so on. They provide room for dreary anxieties or utopian strives with view of the future to be explored beyond conventional ideological political discourse. They also are at the heart of very profitable business sectors.
In any case, the images of wild card events are integral part of the functioning of the economic realm. They could provide insight for adequate and competitive strategic planning of corporations. They could also organize industries to insatiate the longing for security or quite the opposite -to promote for profit what social scientists denote as 'apocalyptic consciousness' or 'apocalyptic allure'.
Politics and wild cards
Politics is the realm where the process of legitimization, distribution, reproduction and preservation of power takes place. Generally speaking, stability is the main consideration guiding the initiation and implementation of various power techniques, strategies and mechanisms. Inviolability of existing power structures is the ultimate end of any current power agencies. Therefore, wild card events are usually regarded as threats since they might disrupt the existing order due to their potential to change the 'rules of the game'. That is why they are sometimes denoted as 'major events', i.e. events with high impact which introduce the possibility to renegotiate the foundations of power. The 11 September attack was such a point and led to re-conceptualization of power in the US and worldwide along the lines of security and the war on terror. Despite the fact that power structures aim to counteract and restrict disturbing wild card events to secure the stability of reproducing power itself, post-wild card periods (of trauma, fear, havoc or even anomie) represent strategically opportune moments to take advantage of the public trust for further consolidation of power. Controversial legislative documents such as The Patriot Act of 2001 or detention sites such as Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib would not be possible to easily justify before the American public prior to 11 September 2001. Counter intuitively, events, which are experienced as wild cards, have their functionality with regard to the stabilization of power.
Nevertheless, power structures are interested in expanding the visibility with regard to zones of uncertainty, which have the potential to cast a shadow on the ability to handle surprising events. They build surveillance and early warning systems, they implement crises management protocols, and they make recovery efforts to mitigate the detrimental consequences for the public and themselves. Still, the greatest challenge before them is overcoming the resilience of their own assumptions, biases and proneness to psychological inertia. Part of the perplexity with regard to the 11 September attacks was due to the belief that such an event was not probable. It was imaginable and therefore integrated in the scenario building exercises of the military (Schwartz, 2004: 4) . However, the amazement and stupor which it caused were accompanied by weakness of both language and logic to articulate what happened and how that event was made possible at all. The mere surprise of actually entering the reality denoted it as a major event, not the number of casualties.
1 Partly this is true for revolutions and regime changes. They could sometimes be rationalized post factum as wild card events not because they were unforeseeable but because they were not anticipated (anticipation presupposes the belief that an event is deemed as plausible to occur). The October 1917 Bolshevik revolution and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union are both illustrative examples for wild card events, which famously dismayed western observers.
Conclusion
Uncertainty has always bothered men with regard to their relation with the future. In the course of human history they made various attempts to respond to that predicament through different means: by a holy man (the oracle, the prophet, the shaman); by culturally specific codes to 'decipher' the zones of uncertainty (astrology, cartomancy, palmistry, numerology); by modern science as a prognostication tool (linear projections of trends and tendencies, and systems analysis) in the context of the domination of the idea of human progress. Today, in a highly dynamic and unstable world, the linear approach with regard to the future is not deemed to be the adequate one. Trend extrapolations and mathematic-statistical models are not designed to capture possible discontinuities, introducing surprising and unexpected events with low probability and significant impact. But envisioning the possible images of those events is a good preparatory technique which fosters reactivity by stretching the span of our foresight reflexes.
This text demonstrated that the syntagma 'wild card event' is more and more integrated in the imagination and the practices of individuals, institutions and organizations. Its functionality in 'taming' uncertainty has three very important aspects -discursive, epistemic and practical, summarized in Table 1 . The notion of a wild card event proves to be a suitable means to articulate and thus discursively and mentally tame the inevitable uncertainty with regard to the future. Wild cards are conceived in the modus of the unprecedented, of surprise, of instability, of failed security, i.e. in the framework of the asymmetrical interaction between causes and effects of an event or a chain of events. They serve as a means to articulate uncertainty. The image of a wild card event is also epistemologically functional in view of the inexorable fact that human beings are imperfect cognitive agents. Scanning for wild cards is an anticipatory strategy: 1) to compensate for the lack of experience with certain events or situations; 2) to manage our ignorance with regard to the future which might manifest itself as pure unawareness, as pronounced neglect or as problematic temporal sensitivity; and 3) for temporal adjustment for individuals and institutions to overcome the effects of the time-space compression in a volatile global environment. Finally, the notion of a wild card event is at the heart of recent developments in the futures studies realm but it is also quite functional for the productivity and profitability of certain economic sectors. Last but not least, it proved to be crucial for the reproduction of political power.
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